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From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching
for the Global Jihadists’ Achilles Heel
ERSEL AYDINLI
George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs,
Washington, DC, USA
This article seeks to uncover a primary source of vulnerability in the global Jihadist
terrorist network. It offers a critical examination of the traditional money lead
for countering global Jihadist terrorism, and concludes that in this case, it is not
the most effective method. Rather, the concept of transnational mobility, both as
it relates to socialization into and professionalization within the Jihadist network,
is identified as the lifeblood of the network, and thus an arguably more appropriate
focus for countering strategies. Issues surrounding travel document security are ana-
lysed within an overarching dichotomous framework of offensive=defensive counter-
terrorism strategies, emphasizing the need for active penetration by intelligence
forces into the terrorist networks and relevant mobility-related realms.
Keywords terrorism, transitional mobility, Jihadist, finance, travel documents,
intelligence, countering terrorism
The Money Lead
Since the 1980s in particular, when the ‘‘money lead’’ came to be emphasized in the
struggle against international drug cartels, police and financial crimes experts have
spent tremendous time and energy honing their skills to undermine the financial sup-
port systems of criminal organizations. Though the argument and practice of apply-
ing similar methods in the fight against terrorist groups has also long existed,1 the
real push for such an approach came after 9=11.2 In the desperate search for an effec-
tive response during the chaotic and traumatic atmosphere following the attacks, the
natural inclination was to fall back on standard operating procedures, and in this
case the structure, mechanisms, and strategies of the money lead were well estab-
lished. The huge volume of media coverage of the Bush administration’s vow to
go after the terrorists’ money not only documents the fact that the money lead strat-
egy almost immediately became a priority in Washington, but also attests to the
popular belief that such an approach was tried and true, and could therefore provide
a guiding light in the daunting new counter-terrorism struggle.
The arguments seemed convincing. A ‘‘follow the money’’ approach could
arguably provide not only preventive measures against future attacks by, for
example, freezing a group’s assets, but even more importantly, could allow coun-
ter-terror forces access to parts of the network hidden behind its visible figure-
heads. It also appeared to present a relatively easy strategy to employ because,
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as noted above, it could draw upon existing legislative, regulatory, and policing
mechanisms. Ultimately, since it was presumed that terrorists could accomplish
little without money, it seemed logical that successfully tracking down their money
routes would enable counter-terrorism forces to slow down or put an end to their
activities.
But not only were the targets in this case no longer traditional money launderers,
drug smugglers, or other such criminal groups, they were not even ‘‘traditional’’ ter-
rorists. Today’s Jihadist3 terror network represents something new among terrorist
organizations,4 and the argument can be made that with this new target, following
the money is not a particularly effective strategy. Indeed, some research over the last
few years has begun to question whether so-called ‘‘finance warfare’’ has been an
appropriate strategy.5 While these studies concede that there are great challenges
to the approach, and most propose ways of improving its tactics and methods, none
has asked whether inherent differences in the nature and operation of this terrorist
target might justify setting new priorities for current countering efforts. If such dif-
ferences exist, what might they be, and what clues might they provide for conducting
a more effective ‘‘war on terrorism’’?
Jihadist Finances
At the heart of the problem seems to be the observation that in the Jihadist terrorist
network, money plays a role different from what counter-terror finance experts have
come to expect. Traditionally, terrorist groups have tended to view money-making as
an essential collective effort, with local cells actively participating in such activities as
drug trafficking, robberies, or mob-related activities, to raise funds for the group’s
operational costs. Not only do such money-making endeavors become an integral
part of the group’s activities, but such a comprehensive system generally leads to
established methods and routes of circulation for the resulting money. As a conse-
quence, there are both greater opportunities for counter-terrorists to track down
the money, and often significant results when they do.
In the case of the Jihadist terrorist network, however, it is often much more
difficult to follow the money. The first problem is that within this network, funds
do not always travel in the expected ways or through the familiar financial
channels, such as wire transfers, large deposits of assets, or even credit card expen-
ditures, all of which can be traced. The Jihadist network has different, ad hoc, and
often seemingly archaic systems, to make their necessary money transfers. The
most often referred to of these in the wake of the 9=11 attacks is the hawala system,
which involves the transfer of funds via an informal association of hawaladars, or
individuals on either end who accept or pay out the requested funds.6 An alternative
is the Selaam system, which basically involves the dispatching of someone to deliver
regards or greetings from one person to another, with an accompanying request for
money. Though generally an explanation of the exact purpose for the request is not
given, there is an understanding that it will be used for the spread of Islam (tabligh),
or that it is connected with the traditional Islamic duty of giving alms (zekat). The
attaching of the financial request to an extension of greetings is basically all that is
needed to conduct the ‘‘transfer.’’ Because this traditional system is widespread among
the global Muslim communities, it is difficult to determine whether any particular
exchange is in support of terrorist activities or is for normal communal or personal
reasons.
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Whatever name is given, these methods generally rely on systems outside
of traditional banking transfers, and in many cases depend on human travelers or
couriers physically carrying the money from one place to another. These systems
are therefore ‘‘humanized,’’ in the sense that they are removed from more technically
sophisticated methods of transfer. In these crucial ways, the Jihadist terrorists’ meth-
ods are not necessarily like those of drug dealers or other more familiar transnational
criminals, and are thus not as conducive to traditional means of tracing.
A second reason why a follow the money approach will have problems is that
there is a continuing popular misperception of bin Laden and, subsequently,
Al Qaeda, as being financially limitless, handing out money liberally for the Jihadist
terrorist cause. Thus, perhaps even more important than possible procedural inade-
quacies of a follow the money strategy, is the underlying myth that the Jihadist net-
work is managing and employing immense amounts of money. Yes, they use money,
but money is not a key factor making the network’s activities possible.
Looking at actual costs of attacks, it has been shown that even major ones like
9=11 were conducted for a full cost of less than $500,000, and smaller, but still sig-
nificant attacks for far less.7 In the case of the 2003 Istanbul bombings, total finan-
cing costs have been estimated at around $75,000.8 Costs are kept low both through
the methods used and the general frugality of the terrorists. Reports on the 9=11
bombings have shown for example how the bombers rented inexpensive cars, stayed
in low-cost hotels, and used coin-operated laundry machines. Similarly, police
reports on the Istanbul bombings describe how the money for the attacks was held
by one or two key figures, who doled it out quite sparingly, forbidding, for example,
such luxuries as using taxis rather than public transport for daily business. It is also
interesting to note that the Jihadist network may not have the burden, as do some
other terrorist organizations, of providing financial support for the families of sui-
cide bombers.9 Also in the police reports from the Istanbul bombings was a state-
ment by the wife of one of the attackers that when she asked her husband who
would look after her and the children after the attack, he replied that ‘‘Allah’’
would.10 The same police report also confirms that this particular woman, lacking
professional training or financial assistance from the network, did indeed go back
to live with her parents after the bombings.
Interestingly, this overall sparing use of money is in part made possible by
certain religious understandings of the Jihadists, among whom it is generally
considered immoral to waste funds, as if by doing so, one would be stealing from
fellow Muslims. The overall lack of excess money, combined with a Jihadist sense
of the immorality of extravagance, leads to extreme efficiency in the use of what-
ever funds are available. In a sense, people are forced into doing the most with
the least amount of money. Jihadist morality reminds its followers that the original
Jihadists at the time of the prophet were people without resources, and since the
current Jihadists seek to repeat the ways of their predecessors, they are also inter-
ested in adopting this aspect. The overall attitude towards money is captured in a
phrase often cited in the texts of Turkish Jihadists: ‘‘Bir lokma, bir hirka’’ —one
bite of food, one piece of clothing. It is also illustrated in the works of the famous
Jihadist figure, Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Azzam spoke extensively about how even
eating ‘‘luxurious’’ food has the potential to corrupt: ‘‘their stomachs,’’ he said,
‘‘are full of well cooked chicken and rice, so they forget their purpose for being
in the land of Jihad.’’11 Noteworthy is the idea that the standard for well-being
is associated here with such an arguably simple item as a chicken, and the
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accusatory finger subsequently pointed at those who would seek such foods over
simpler menus of perhaps bread and basic vegetables. For those individuals who
opt to store any extra wealth rather than contribute it to the cause of expanding
the Muslim nation, Azzam was equally harsh. He referred repeatedly to articles
of the Tevbe verse, in which the gold or silver one saves for oneself, becomes
‘‘knives and swords in their chests on Judgement Day.’’12
Ultimately, whether one considers the often untraceable means used by the Jiha-
dists for moving money around, the relatively small amounts of money this network
has shown it requires to carry out significant attacks, or the social attitudes among
Jihadists towards frugality, it is evident that money does not play the critical role for
the Jihadists that it may play for other terrorist groups. Therefore, the ‘‘money lead’’
approach—though surely it has some role in current counter-terrorism efforts—does
not warrant being given priority.
Transnational Mobility
If money circulation is not the key to unraveling the network, then what is? What is
it that this network needs even more than money? And how can counter-terror stra-
tegists take advantage of this need to improve their ability to fight against this net-
work? Let’s first consider two intertwined aspects of the Jihadist terrorist
phenomenon: the transnational nature of the Jihadist struggle and the Jihadists
themselves.
In the late 1980s, the leadership of the Jihadist movement went through debates,
similar to those that once raged among Communist leaders of the twentieth century’s
great global ideological challenge for world domination. The debates evolved around
whether the group’s struggle should be concentrated in a single country (and later
expand outwards from there) or whether it should take place simultaneously around
the world. As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, discussions on this topic
between the ‘‘single country’’ advocate, Azzam, and the multiple front supporters,
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, ended in Azzam’s execution and a shift
towards the latter position.13 The strengthening of the idea of global struggle neces-
sitated a transnational organization of the Jihadist network, unlike that of the more
common territorially-fixed terrorist organizations, which are usually located in single
countries. The network’s need to become transnational then became all that much
more urgent when Al Qaeda was forced to desert Afghanistan in the face of U.S.
attacks, and flee abroad in a dispersed manner.14 The upshot is that the Jihadist ter-
ror network has become largely transnational in nature, and as such is reliant on
transnational mobility.
Turning to the Jihadists themselves, one outstanding characteristic among them
is that they are a group of individuals who are present in today’s world, but who
strongly believe that they are reliving a struggle that occurred at the time of the pro-
phet Mohammed, during the expanding years of Islam. In other words, Jihadists are
socialized from early on to interpret today’s political conditions and daily challenges
according to references (both religious and anecdotal) of roughly 1,400 years ago. In
a sense, time, space, and history become integrated, to form the holistic reality
in which the Jihadists present the mission, challenges, and prescriptions for a global
Muslim nation. A key aspect of this integration, one discussed in more detail in the
following section, is the understanding that the Prophet’s own migration to Medina
in order to save the faith, becomes a blueprint for today’s Jihadists. Perhaps the best
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indication of the centrality of mobility for the Jihadist movement is therefore
reflected in the Jihadist slogan, ‘‘faith—hijra (migration)—jihad—Ummah (global
Muslim community),’’ in other words, the initiation into Jihadism begins with an
act of physical movement, or mobility.15
Thus both the retrospective vision of Jihadists and the global organizational nat-
ure of their movement reveal an extreme need for transnational mobility,16 a need so
strong that it may present a better alternative to the counter-terror forces’ emphasis
on the money lead. Mobility emerges as essential for the Jihadists at more concrete
levels as well. When you look for example at their recruitment patterns or at how
individuals come to join Jihadist terrorist activity, one frequently finds a connection
to mobility. A traditional pathway to becoming a Jihadist was by travelling to the
jihad lands, such as Afghanistan, while another came about when individuals were
students travelling to the West for further education. Yet another pathway for some
was through normal migration to the West for economic purposes. The common
point in these pathways to joining the Jihadists and ultimately contributing to the
formation of what can now be spoken of as a global Jihadist network, is that they
involve travelling, in other words, mobility.17
Mobility and Socialization
Two stages in the evolution of a Jihadist exemplify the absolute need for mobility
among network members. The first is what could be labeled as mobility required
by initial socialization. Even before an individual becomes an active member of the
Jihadist network, he may begin to interpret his place in the world according to the
religious teachings of the Koran, and in particular, the verses focusing on the early
days of the first Muslims. If he too senses himself isolated from the world around
him, as being surrounded by non-Muslims or imperfect ones, he may come to view
the world dichotomously, as early Muslims did—as the dar al Islam (abode of Islam)
and the dar al harb (house of war, or the home of the of kufr, or infidel, where Islam is
denied or rejected). The moment this person defines his local environment as part of
the dar al harb, it is often the case that he feels he must follow the practice of the early
Muslims, who left the land of the Mushrik (idolater and polytheist) in Mecca and
migrated to Medina. He too must migrate (make hijra) to the land of Islam.18 In
the case of the Istanbul bombers, years before the bombings, they had openly rejected
what they saw as the non-Islamic lifestyle being led by most Turks, and expressed
what they saw as their obligation to migrate to a land where they could live and fight
for true Islam.19 For them, and many others in the 1980s, this place was Afghanistan.
Later, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and nowadays Iraq and once again perhaps
Afghanistan, constitute primary destinations for those seeking a land where they
can fight against non-believers for a true Islamic ideal.
Interestingly, even the recent examples of ‘‘home-grown’’ terrorism among the
diaspora communities in Europe—namely, the July 2005 London bombings—and
the possibility that future threats may increasingly come from this type of terrorism,
do not diminish the importance of mobility, particularly at the level of initial and
continuing socialization into Jihadist circles. The diaspora-based Jihadist communi-
ties may not be as local as they appear, as members of these circles still tend to travel,
often to their homelands, both for business and personal reasons, and quite often for
purposes of finding marriage partners with appropriate worldviews.20
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Mobility, Professionalization, and the Role of the Connectors
For the individual who has become an active part of the network, a second stage of
mobility may start—a mobility required by professionalization within the Jihadist
community. If an individual becomes an operative, he will require a more sophisti-
cated form of mobility in order to reach transnational destinations and carry out
both legal and illegal network-related activities. If, for example, the individual is
involved in the network’s financial system (e.g., sending money with couriers), he will
need to be able to travel easily across borders. Naturally if individuals are traveling
abroad to ‘‘Jihad’’ lands, they will need mobility to get there, but even while there,
mobility needs may arise in ways one may not expect. According to Azzam’s
speeches and writings from the days of the war in Afghanistan, and likely relevant
now to foreign Jihadists fighting in Iraq, every Jihadist fighting abroad has the
right—and indeed, duty—to return home for a period of time each year, in order
to spend time with his family, and communicate the cause to others (recruitment).
For unmarried Jihadists, Azzam prescribed two months ‘‘holiday,’’ to ‘‘eat well’’
and ‘‘refresh’’ oneself. For those who are married, he allowed for one and one-half
month breaks at least twice annually.21
Mobility is of course most crucial for those operatives whose job is to serve as con-
nectors between the core of the network and the outlying ‘‘sleeping’’ cells around the
globe. These connector figures became key elements in the organization of the Jihadist
network after it was kicked out of Afghanistan post-9=11, and forced into a kind of
‘‘transnational exile.’’ Contrary to expectations and hopes, the network proved adept
at reorganizing itself and adapting to the transnational environment, and in fact con-
tinued to carry out successful attacks—though many were lower profile ones than
the 2001 attacks in the U.S.22 Although local cells played the crucial roles in actually
carrying out the post-9=11 attacks in, for example, Istanbul, Bali, Casablanca, and
Madrid, in each case there was generally a connector figure, who brought in the neces-
sary know-how, leadership skills, money, and guidance from the Al Qaeda leadership,
to help recruit and build up these seemingly homegrown cells.
This practice of having a connector was not entirely new to Al Qaeda; in fact,
the 9=11 attacks themselves were largely made possible due to the contributions of
a similar ‘‘connector’’ to coordinate the operation. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
was the ‘‘chief manager’’ of the 9=11 plot.23 The 9=11 report goes on to suggest that
without his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills, the 9=11 attacks
would probably not have occurred—or at least not on the scale that they did. More
importantly, if Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had not had access to a great mobility
across continents and between countries, traveling to the U.S.A., Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, Qatar, the Philippines, Sudan, Yemen, Malaysia, Brazil, Iran, and Indonesia,
he would not have been able to cultivate transnational relationships, to recruit
and build up local cells, to transmit orders, and ultimately to pull together the trans-
national operation that resulted in the 9=11 attacks.
Yet another mobile connector was Karim Majjati. A former medical student
from Morocco, Majjati was responsible for organizing the group that blew up three
residential compounds in Riyadh in May 2003. Just one week later and 3,000 miles
away, another group he had organized and helped, pulled off the deadliest suicide
attacks in Moroccan history, the Casablanca bombings, which killed forty-five
people. Majjati, who was killed by accident in a shootout in April 2005 in
Saudi Arabia, was both extremely mobile and a master of avoiding attention when
306 E. Aydinli
traveling between countries thanks to his language abilities and multiple passports.
Although he traveled so extensively that a neighbor reported seeing him only twice in
the three years after the 9=11 attacks, an anonymous security official admits that
they had ‘‘no tangible evidence where he was.’’24
It is also now known that the network’s November 2003 bombings in Istanbul
would probably not have been accomplished if it were not for a connector figure
who had the clear plans in mind, the necessary know-how, and the (albeit not sub-
stantial) financial backing.25 In this case, the connector was Habib Aktas, a Turkish
citizen of Arab origin. Court documents and police reports reveal certain character-
istics about Aktas, which no doubt helped to make him an important example of
these crucial connector figures, namely, his highly developed computer skills, linguis-
tic skills (Arabic, English, and Turkish), vast religious knowledge, reported char-
isma, actual experience ‘‘in the field’’ in Afghanistan and, of course, being in
possession of means, which permitted him mobility. It was his frequent travels
throughout the Middle East, and back and forth to Turkey, which enabled him to
build up the Istanbul cell and equip it in every sense from ideology to motivation
to technology, to prepare for the bombings.26 Aktas reportedly continued to travel
after the attacks, but is now believed to have been killed in Iraq in spring 2005.
The question then arises, what can be done to monitor mobility? Clearly, pass-
ports and other travel documents present the most concrete manifestations of
mobility, and thus are vital to the Jihadist terrorist network. Passports and other tra-
vel documents were so crucial to Al Qaeda’s operations even prior to the 9=11
attacks, that the organization operated an office of passports at the Kandahar Air-
port in Afghanistan, in which they altered papers, including passports, visas, and
identification cards.27
If mobility is accepted as essential for successful operation of the Jihadist terror-
ist network, and travel documents are clearly the key tools with which states can
monitor such transnational mobility, it is essential to seek ways of coping with the
dilemma that these key tools can be forged and manipulated—and unfortunately,
adequate attention has not yet been paid to this issue.28 Terrorists are of course
quick to master forgery and manipulation techniques,29 and to re-adapt when coun-
tering measures are taken—making an over-reliance on any one countering tech-
nique or technology a mistake. The following section provides an actual account
of how travel documents have been manipulated. The hope is that through detailing
particular cases like this, there is the possibility to better understand the overall issue
of travel document security and thus support better countering measures.
Forgery Tales and Mobility
Post-event investigations in the case of the Istanbul bombings were very successful.30
Within just a couple of weeks, the details of how the attacks were prepared as well as
the names and histories of the perpetrators had all been uncovered. The crucial clues
came when police graphologists were able to connect the handwriting on a receipt
found at the crime scene with the writing on a passport application, and thus track
down the person’s photograph. With this, the police uncovered the true identity of a
key operative, who was subsequently arrested at the Iranian border. In the Istanbul
bombings case, the need for mobility proved to be the terrorists’ Achilles heel.
It is clear that transnational mobility requires traveling documents—legal, or
more commonly, illegal ones. In Turkey, these precious papers are the most
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frequently found items in police raids on Jihadists’ quarters, and multiple pass-
ports—often Turkish but also from other countries such as Morocco, Algeria, or
Pakistan—are often confiscated from individuals arrested while crossing Turkish
borders. Due to the high volume of illegal migration through Istanbul to Europe,
the city on the Bosphorus has become a veritable passport capital. With passports
being stolen, sold, handed from person to person in the quest to obtain (by whatever
means possible) a visa to the West, and various other tactics for obtaining legal
documents in other peoples’ names, it becomes disturbingly obvious that obtaining
illegal travel documents is not as difficult as one might expect.
According to Turkish intelligence sources, when terrorists want to obtain false
travel documents, two primary routes exist. First, they can turn to the established
forged travel document industry, which serves a wide audience, from individuals
seeking documents to travel and find work, to mafia criminals and drug traffickers,
to terrorists. People in the industry collect passports, generally by stealing or
purchasing them, and then replace the original photos with those of the people
who wish to use them.
An alternative technique for acquiring travel documents, one that was used
by individuals involved in the Istanbul bombings, requires the help of a local
person—often a friend or relative. This person is asked to go to his town manager
(muhtar) and request a paper showing that he has lost his ID. The operative needing
the passport then takes that paper and goes to the regional census office to request a
new ID. Since there are no photographs on birth documents, and since the census
office only wires or telephones for confirmation about the original records, the second
person is able to pretend to be the first by simply providing the muhtar’s paper and
showing his own photo. The center then issues a new ID, which is genuine, except
for the photo. The perpetrators generally choose to adopt the IDs of relatives or
friends who come from small districts and who are not likely to leave those districts,
so the chance of accidental discovery is minimal. Moreover, since the information on
the ID generally is ‘‘clean,’’ that is, it belongs to a law-abiding citizen, the subsequent
application process to the police for a passport is likely to pass easily. Within days, the
criminal is able to obtain a fully legal and real passport, in someone else’s name, but
with his own photo in it. Recent reforms and developments in policing services in Tur-
key have made it possible to apply for a passport online, making the process even
more vulnerable to such forgery attempts. On the other hand, the technique is not
necessarily an easy one to carry out, in that it relies on trusting relationships between
the operatives and the individuals whose identities are being ‘‘borrowed.’’
Combating these two primary methods of obtaining false travel documents
requires different approaches. For the latter method, the only sure way is to
strengthen the procedures used by local government offices. This would have to
involve more stringent methods of double-checking between offices as well as
reforming birth records to include a verifiable means of identification, such as
pictures or possibly even fingerprints.
Current counter-terrorism efforts to confront the larger illegal travel document
industry suffer from problems both at the local and global levels. In the Turkish
example, policing of travel document fraud at the local level is hampered by bureau-
cratic politics in which tasks are often ineffectively divided between various depart-
ments. Depending on the victim or on the suspected user of the travel documents,
cases may be handled by departments as diverse as tourism=foreigners, small crimes,
organized crime, narcotics, financial crimes, or counter-terrorism. At the global level,
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some states monitor travel document fraud better than others do. These policies result
in inconsistencies in the recording and sharing of border control records.31
Yet mobility-related counter-terrorism strategies are discussed in a primarily
defensive manner. In other words, when confronted with the problem of mobile
terrorists (or other criminals), an almost instinctive response strategy is to go on
the defensive—to build up better walls and border controls, and try to stop the illegal
infiltration of people with bad intentions.32 While these types of defensive moves
have a role to play, it is extremely important to understand the risks of an overly
defensive positioning, and explore ways of alternative, ‘‘offensive’’ moves that can
be taken in the effort to stem terrorists’ mobility.
The Pitfalls of Defensive Intelligence
The 9=11 Report includes a wide variety of suggestions for ways to fight against ter-
rorists, among which are methods such as the tracing of passports or increased sur-
veillance of particular travel routes. However, the report looks at passports or travel
patterns from a perspective of using them to defend homeland security, prevent
future penetration, and thus future attacks. The understanding is a defensive one
designed to stop the suspects at the border and send them back to where they’ve
come from. It is reflective of a broad tendency towards defensive counter-terrorism
strategies—a problem to which most countries succumb, as each tries to defend its
own borders and territory.
A strategic over-reliance on defensive, border-protecting efforts is bound to fail
in many cases. It is inadequate for effective counter-terrorism in developed countries,
which have significant technological resources and personnel to protect their bor-
ders, and it may be downright dangerous when it is applied by countries with fewer
resources. In such countries, the natural response when encountering suspicious indi-
viduals or activities within or at their borders, is often simply to expel the suspects
without conducting full intelligence investigations. The result may be active or
potential Jihadists who become part of a transnational soccer match where they
are passed back and forth between different countries’ intelligence agencies. This
game means that little or no practical information about the Jihadists’ political
intentions are uncovered. These individuals eventually become known when they
finally succeed in committing a real act. Some figures involved in the Istanbul bomb-
ings, for example, had been earlier rounded up in Georgia, which they had entered en
route to Jihadist lands (Chechnya and Afghanistan). Although they were deemed
suspicious by the Georgian police, they were simply brought back to the Turkish
border and deposited there.33 Since the suspicions on the Georgian side were not
shared (let alone investigations having been made) with the Turkish side, they were
subsequently released by Turkish authorities.
Such examples are common because of the lack of consciousness for more offens-
ive counter-terrorism strategies, and are exacerbated in many parts of the world due
to the lack of resources. For Turkey and its neighboring countries, border authorities
may lack actual holding cells for suspects. They are unlikely to have official funds
with which to feed any individuals being held, or to have technological aids such as
fax machines or computers, through which to share intelligence information. The
problem is that a counter-terror struggle that relies on defensive tactics comes to
resemble a crowded neighborhood in which everyone carefully sweeps the dirt from
their houses into the street, without considering that there are no street cleaners.
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Offensive Intelligence
The undeniable significance of the current transnational terror threat, and the clear
importance of mobility to transnational terrorists, mean that such uncoordinated,
defensive-based efforts against travel document crimes can no longer be tolerated.
This particular realm of criminal activity must be emphasized for the key role it
may play in global security, and countered accordingly. Offensive measures involv-
ing the active penetration of human intelligence into the travel document industry, as
well as of course the terrorist networks themselves, must be given priority on a global
basis. Among the many benefits of such penetration into the former, would be to
help out with sting operations, or with efforts to feed what could be called ‘‘bait’’
passports into the system. Obviously, direct human intelligence is also the only
way to obtain direct information on suspicious passports or to obtain copies of
the photos of the individuals intending to use these passports. Intelligence pen-
etration of the laboratories which prepare the travel documents for terrorist organi-
zations, could provide useful leads for tracing the mobility of members and their
future activities. Most importantly, offensive efforts such as these to track and trace
terrorists’ travel documents and thus their transnational mobility could enable coun-
ter-terrorist forces to build up a database of the types of documents used, and to
actually map out the terrorists’ mobility patterns. By detecting such patterns, it
would be possible to monitor the preparation stages of upcoming attacks and,
eventually, to gain some kind of early warning capacity about future events.
The history of counter-terrorism around the globe teaches us that a defensive
policy which focuses on building walls, either physical or psychological, almost
always leaves the other side of the wall inadequately supervised and a fertile breeding
ground for terrorist activities. It is in the nature of walls to first block your vision, to
give you a false sense of security, and probably to compromise your ability to be
truly engaged offensively.
While much of the Jihadist movement’s efforts seem to have a concentrated
focus these days in Iraq, this type of more traditional guerilla warfare will not remain
the typical code of operation for the network. No matter what the outcome in Iraq, it
is virtually inevitable that the global Jihadist network will at some point return with
full energy to its operational modus vivendi of a terrorism based on transnational
mobility. A constant offensive engagement with their key mobility procedures and
apparatuses is the only way to have a degree of control over the war on terrorism.
The Jihadists’ great need for mobility and thus for travel documents, either genuine
or forged, presents the most feasible Achilles heel for offensive counter-terrorist
strategies.
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